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A general formalism on stochastic choice is presented. Tje 
Rationalizability and Recoverability (Identification) problems are 
discussed. For the identification issue parametric examples are 
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The notes on Stochastic choice that follow were presented at a 
meeting held in San Sebastian in June of 1983 and organised by 
Salvador Barberà. It was research in progress that, alas, was never 
pursued. But it seems, by its subject, a most indicated contribution 
to a volume to honour Ket Richter. Obviously, I have the hope, but 
not the certainty, that something is still of interest in them. Or 
simply that there will be something to catch the sharp analytical eye 
of Ket. With my best regards to Ket, a model for us all of how theory 
should be done, here they go. I have corrected some obvious 
inaccuracies and, occasionally, tightened some looseness of language. 
I have also added some references (in particular, Falmagne,1978, 
Fishburn,1998, Barberà and Pattanaik,1986, McFadden and Richter,1991, 
McFadden,2004, are very relevant to the subject matter of these 
notes) and taken into account the remarks of a referee(whom I thank). 
Otherwise the text is as in 1983.  
 
 
I. A General Formalism 
 
A very general setting for the stochastic choice problem can be 
described thus (see also Manski, 1977). There is given as data: 
 
(1)  A set of alternatives  X .  It is convenient to think of  X  
as finite. 




B Y .  A point of Y  is 
a selection of an alternative in every budget.  Denote by 
 the probability measures on  M Y . 
(3)  A set of admissible statistics  . , : J j R f j ∈ → M   
(4)  A set of observed values  J j a j ∈ ,  of the statistics. 
   3
As an example, the usual stochastic choice problem corresponds to the 
above where the admissible statistics in (3) are the marginal 
distributions.  [Precisely:   is admissible if and only if it is of 
the form 
f
() () ∫ = dv y v f ψ  where  ( ) y ψ  is the projection on one 
variable].  Even more restricted, if the admissible statistics are 
the mean of every marginal we have as data a sort of aggregate 
demand.  Another situation falling in the above setting would be one 
where for every alternative x  we are given the probability that x  is 
chosen for some budget, etc. 
 
Denote by   the set of linear orders on  P X . 
Every probability measure µ  on  induces a probability measure   
on 
P µ v
Y  by the rule  () { P ∈ = f µ µ A v : denoting by  ( ) B x  the  maximal 
element on 
− f
B ∈ B  we have  ( ) B B {} } A x ∈ ∈B . 
 
That is to say,   is the measure generated on  µ v Y  by the choice 
vectors induced by preferences. 
 
We then have two problems: 
 
Rationalizability problem:  A stochastic choice situation (described 
by (1)-(4) above) can be rationalized if there is a probability 
measure µ  on P such that  ( ) j j a v f = µ  for every  j . 
 
Which conditions must the data of the problem satisfy in order for a 
rationalization to exist? 
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Recoverability (or identification) problem:  Assuming that the data 
are rationalizable, when is the rationalization unique? 
 
Remark:  Strictly speaking there is still a third problem, previous 
to the rationalizability one and vacuously non-restrictive in the 
usual stochastic choice model.  It could be called the compatibility 
problem, namely, under which conditions there is a probability 






II.- A Particular Case 
 
After so much generality I become very concrete.  I concentrate for 
the rest of the Notes on the particular case where there is a 
distinguished alternative, denoted 0, every  B ∈ B  includes 0 and for 
each  B ∈ B  there is an admissible statistic which is the probability 
that 0 is not selected in B .  In other words, the data of the 
problem is an array  p (B ),  B ∈ B , to be interpreted as asserting 
that given B  the probability that 0 be the preferred element is 
. We always put  () B p − 1 {} () 0 0 = p . 
 
Define the equivalence relation ≈ on P  by f f′ ≈  iff " .  
Obviously, if 
" 0 0 f f ′ ⇔ x x
f f ′ ≈  then the data of the problem will never be able 
to distinguish between   and  f f′.  Therefore, the rationalizability 
and, above all, the recoverability problem should properly be posed 
with respect to 
∗ P  =  ≈
P .  Note that for the elements of 
∗ P  the   5
transitivity requirement has no strength. Avoiding the transitivity 
issue is the main advantage of analyzing the particular case of a 
distinguished alternative. 
 
I briefly discuss three subcases that differ by the nature of the 
admissible  .  Take  ￿ X  finite, with # 1 + = n X . 
 
 
(a)  { } B B
X ∈ ∈ = 0 : 2 B  
 
The rationalization problem for this subcase has been extensively 
treated and is completely solved. See Falmagne, 1978, Barberà and 
Pattanaik, 1986, Cohen and Falmagne, 1990, Barberà, 1991..   
 
 
Every preference in 
∗ P  can be identified with a set  B ∈ B , i.e. B  
is the set of alternatives at least as good as 0.  Then a probability 
on 
∗ P  can be identified with a list  ( ) 1 0 ≤ ≤ B π ,  1 ) ( = ∑
∈B B
π B .    If 








π − 1  for 
every 
A p B
B ∈ B .  Therefore,  p (  ) can be rationalized if and only if 
the following recursion process (see Barberà and Pattanaik, 
1986)yields a probability measure.  Put first.   { } ( ) − ( ) X p =1 0 π .  
Suppose now that  () C π  has been computed for any C  up to size m .  
Put then 
1 +




B π 0 ∪ ) C  for B of size m + 2   
Obviously, this recursion process gives us a complete list  ( B) π , 
B ∈ B .  Also,  () =1 ∑
∈B B
B π  by construction.  Therefore, π is a   6
probability measure, i.e. in admissible rationalization, if and only 
if  () B π  is non-negative for all B .  Those are the conditions 
obtained in the above references. Note that if  p (  ) is 
rationalizable then the rationalization is unique and can be 





Recoverability, i.e. uniqueness, is not surprising in view of the 
fact that one gets from π  to  p  by a linear transformation and that 
there are as many equations (one for each B ) as unknowns (one for 
each  ). 
 
(b)  { B B
X ∈ ∈ 0 : 2 , #   } 2 = B
 
This is in a sense the polar opposite to subcase (a).  Here we only 
have the outcome of the pairwise matching of 0 against every  .  
We write  . 
0 ≠ x
{} () ( x p x p = , 0 )
 
It is obvious that in this subcase, where there is much less 
information than in (a), any  p (  ) can be rationalized.  Indeed, any 
p (  ) can be looked at as a point in [ ]
n 1 , 0 .  Every extreme point of 
this convex set is of the form  p (  ) { } 1 , 0 ∈  and can be rationalized 
(by ordering  ).  Therefore, the entire  () " 1 0 " = ⇔ x p x f [ ]
n 1 , 0  can be 
rationalized. 
 
The counterpart to the above pleasant fact is that the preference 
distribution cannot be recovered.  This is clear counting equations 
 and unknowns  , one for every  ( n
n 2 (
X B 2 ∈ ,  ∈ 0 . 
   7
(c) Intermediate subcases 
 
To get clean results for families   intermediate between subcases 
(b) and (a)is hard. Consider, for example, the subcase 
￿
{ B B
X ∈ ∈ = 0 : 2   ￿ , # . It is a good exercise to verify that for 
the instance represented in the figure below (with 
} 3 = B
d c b a x , , , , 0 = ) 




a          1          b          1          c 
 












From now on I limit myself to subcase (b), i.e. our data is the 
probability   of any   winning against 0. The common fact in 
the next two sections is that restrictions are imposed on underlying 
permissible preferences.  In section III I study a rationalization 
problem with a convexity hypothesis on preferences.  In section IV I 
sketch and discuss an analytic treatment of the recoverability 
problem. 




III.- Rationalizability with convex preferences 
 
With 0 a distinguished alternative in  X  we are given, for every 
,   a number  X x∈ 0 ≠ x ( ) 1 0 ≤ ≤ x p  which is interpreted as the   8
probability of x winning over 0.  We have seen (subcase (b) in II) 
that  p  can always be rationalized by a distribution µ  on P .  In 
applications, however, it may be important that µ  give positive 











Suppose, for example, that  X X =
∗ \{ } 0  is a subset of a linear space.  
Say 
m R ⊂ .  Then we may be interested in rationalizing by members 
of the set of convex (or, more precisely, convex-compatible) 
preferences, i.e.   if   for every  , 
and   ∈ (convex hull   then  . 












It is no longer true that any  p ( . ) can be rationalized by a µ  
concentrated on  .  The problem of characterizing the set of 
admissible 
C P
p ( . ) seems pretty hard indeed.  But for the simple 
case, i.e.   (the set  1 = m
∗ X  lies in the real line) the solution is 
fairly trivial. 
 
Let  R ⊂ .  Put   where   for  { n x x X ,..., 1 =
∗ } j i x x > i .  Denote 
. 
>
() i p ) i x =
 
Proposition:  The function  [ ] 1 , 0 : →
∗ X p  can be rationalized by a µ  
on  C P  if and only if  {} 1 , 0 max
2






i i p p p .   
Remark:  Presumably the proposition can be extended to the case where 
X ⊂
∗  is compact.  The general statement would then be along the 
lines: “The function  [ ] 1 , 0 : →
∗ X p  can be rationalized by a   on    C P  9
if and only if it is of bounded variation and has variation norm 








Proof of the Proposition: 
 
(1) Necessity:  Identifying sets with preferences let   be the set 
of convex preferences.  For every 
C B
n   1,..., i =  denote 
{ B x B x B i i ∈ } ∉ ∈ = − , : 1 C B .  These sets constitute, by the convexity 
hypothesis, a partition of  .  So, if  C B π   is a probability measure 




B π π  
generates p .  Then  () 1 B 1 p = π .  Consider any  1 i > .  We have 
{} () B x B i ∈ ∈ = : C B π .  But { } { B xi ∈ B B xi B ∈ ∪ = ∈ ∈ : C i B B : C B  and 
 for some j less than i) .  This is a disjoint union and, by 
convexity, the second set is a subset of 
B ∈
{ } B x B i ∈ ∈ −1 : C B  which 
probability is  .  Therefore  1 - i p ( ) 1 − + ≤ i i p i p B π , or 
{} ( ) i i B p π ≤ − −1 , 0 i p .  Hence,   and necessity 
is established. 







(2) Sufficiency:  We shall actually show that: “There is always a π  
such that  ”.  So, let the bracketed 
statement be an induction hypothesis on  .  It is obviously true for 
.  Let it be true for 









p p p B
2







.  In particular for the set 
, i.e. there is a probability measure  { ,..., 1 − n x π  on 
 such that:  {} B xn ∉ : C B B∈ =
1 - n
C B  10
(a)  , and   () { }1 , 0 max
1
2

























B p n i π , 1
Now we extend π  to 
* X  as follows.  Let  { } n n p p , min 1 − = n q . 
 
For any   such that 
1 - n
C B ∈ B B xn ∈ −1  consider the rule  .  
Under 
{} n x B B ∪ →
this rule transfer a probability weight   from  n q
{ } B xn ∈ −1 : B∈
1 - n
C B  to  .  If  C B n n p q =  then we are done:  the equality 
in (a) has not been altered and (b) also holds for  n i = . If 
 then we in addition transfer a probability weight 
 from the set 
n p < n n p q = −1





.  This can be done because 
by the induction hypothesis  .  Then 
again the equality in (a) remains and (b) has been extended to  .  
This concludes the induction step. 









i i p )≥ 







Remark:  As it should be expected if the condition of the proposition 
holds then the admissible probability on preferences need not be 
unique.  Suppose that  { } 2 , 1 =
∗ X  and 
3
1
1 = p , 
3
1
2 = p .  Then two 
admissible π  are   {} () { () }
3
1
" = π 2 1 =π ,  () "
3
1




2 , 1 " = ′ π , () "
3
2
= ′ φ π .  The π  obtained by construction in the proof 
of the proposition would be π′ in this example, namely, it is the 
one that maximizes the probability that 0 be the overall maximin,   11
i.e.  () φ π .  The construction of the proof seems to indicate that this 
maximizing probability measure is unique. 







IV.- Analytic treatment of the recoverability problem 
 
We keep studying the distinguished alternative case.  We now take  X  
to be an Euclidean space 
n R .  The distinguished alternative is the 
origin 0.  The function  [ ] 1 , 0 → : X p  gives the probability   that  () x p
x  wins against 0.  For convenience,  p is left undefined at 0. 
 
For an analytic treatment it is important (or, at least, convenient) 
that the set of admissible preferences be somehow restricted to 
depend on a finite number of parameters.  So, we assume that we have 
given a parameter set   which, to make life simple, we identify with 
some Euclidean space 
Q
m R .  For every parameter value  Q q∈  
preferences are expressed by a utility function  , normalized 
to equal zero whenever
) q , U(x
x  = 0. It is assumed that   is a 
“nice” function (continuous, differentiable, analytic,…). 
R → R
m nx  R : U
 
Given a probability measure µ  on   a probability choice function 
 is generated as follows: 
Q
1 : X P ]




o q x q
dq q f q x x p
, U :
0 , U :  where the second equality applies 
only if   has a density  .  From now on we shall assume that all  f
µ  we deal with have densities which, moreover, are sufficiently nice   12
(say of class   and equal to zero outside of a compact set, or, at 







The recoverability problem is then: Assuming that  p  is generated as 
above, can   be uniquely recovered from  f p (in the class of “nice” 
densities)? 
 
Remark:  Strictly speaking the recoverability problem should be posed 
only for the family of indifference curves passing through the origin 
because this is all the information that  p  uses.  But, in the 
parameterized world we are now working in, recovering the 
indifference curve will usually be tantamount, (i.e. except perhaps 
for a normalizing parameter) to recovering the entire utility 
function.  So, I do not worry about the distinction. 
 
For the remaining of this section I discuss an extended example with 
 and   a general quadratic: 
.  So, without further a priori 
restrictions we have five parameters, i.e. 
2 = n
, U q x
( x, U
2
1 + () 2 1 2 1 ex dx x cx ax + + =
5 = m .  I consider a 
sequence of three subcases, which differ by the type of a priori 
restriction imposed. 
 
Example 1:  Take   as a priori restrictions.  0 = = = c b a
 
(The same qualitative features of the example are obtained with other 
combinations of three zero restrictions, eg.  0 = = = e d c , or 
).  In this case  0 = = = e d b ( ) q x, U  reduces to 
.  () ( U , U x q x ≡ 2 1 , , ex dx d +  13
This model is not identified.  Take, for example,  ()
2
1
= x p  for all 
x .  Any symmetric density   on the d f e −  plane will generate  p  
because, for any  x { 1 } 0 : , , 2 > + ex dx e d  is just the half space above the 
hyperplane with normal  x  and the integral of a symmetric density on 
a half space is 
2
1
















Example 2:  As in example 1,  0 = = = c b a .  But suppose now that 
in addition there is another restriction in the form of a non-
homogeneous linear equation.  For instance,  1 = +e d .  The origin of 
this restriction could be, for example, a normalization convention. 
 
Then the model is obviously identified because given any underlying 
density   we can use  f p  to compute the distribution function of   
on the line defined by 
f
1 = +e d  on the  e d −  plane. 
 
Observe also that   can be recovered by using only the information 
contained in the 
f
p  function in any arbitrarily small neighbourhood 
of zero.   14
 
After discussing two more examples I shall present, in the next 
section, a recoverability proposition for arbitrary   and n  which 




Example 3:   ,  ,  1 = a 1 = b 0 = c . 
 
In this case for given   the indifference curves of the utility 




2 x + () 2 1
2



















 − − ,
2
d
 is closer to  x  than to 0. 
 
So, in the obvious way we can identify the variable and the parameter 
space and think of densities   as being defined on the  f x  space 
itself (think of the parameter as the peak of the preferences).  Note 
that   is the integral of   on the half space of vectors to the 
side that includes   of the line perpendicular to 
() x p f
x x  and cutting the 
segment   in its middle point (this is the half space of vectors 





[Remark:  The similarities of this with the well known majority 
voting model are intended]. 
 
Now a mathematical disgression. 
   15
Let   be the 1-dimensional sphere in two dimensional Euclidean 
space.  Given   we can define a function   by letting 
1 S
) t
f R R S → x  :
1 ψ
( v, ψ  be the integral of the   function on the line (more 
generally, affine subspace) 
f
{ } t y v y = . :  endowed with the usual 
Lebesgue measure.  In Fourier analysis this function (as well as its 




− x  :
1 ψ
Radon transform of   and, not surprisingly, it is useful in 
things like X-ray reconstruction.  The fact is that there is an 
inversion formula such that if   is “nice” then starting with 
f
f () t v, ψ  
we recover  .  f
 
The inversion formula is particularly simple for the case at hand 
where   is defined on the plane and the Radon transform (also called 
in this case the X-ray transform) evaluates integrals on lines.  For 
any   and   let n  be the average value of 
f
x 0 > s () x s ( ) t v, ψ  on lines 
which are at a distance   from  s x , i.e.  () () + =
2
1







v v ψ n .  
Then it turns out that if   is continuous and has a compact support 
 can be recovered by the formula 
f








x dns f  where the 
integral is in the sense of Stieltjes.  More precisely, and 

























x f  
See Shepp and Kruskal (1978), Helgason, (1980), or Dym and McKean 
(1972) for these Fourier analysis techniques. Their relevance for 
recoverability problems in economics has been noted in another   16
context by Ph. Dybvig and A. McLennan. I would also like to thank A. 
Grunbaum for the mathematical references. 
 
Back to Example 3.  The relevance of the mathematical disgression to 
our problem is that the Radon Transform of the density   can be 
computed from the choice probabilities 
f
( ) x p .  As it is clear from the 
geometric discussion: 





− = , ψ  
(Strictly speaking the above applies to  0 ≠ t .  For  0 = t  just let 
() ( t v v
t , lim 0 ,
0 ) ψ ψ
→ = ) 
 
Summing up:  the model of example 3 has the recoverability property.  
Note however that, in contrast to example 2, it is now essential to 
use all the information contained in  ( ) x p .  Restricting onerself to a 
small neighbourhood of 0 will not do. 
 
Remark:  Given an arbitrary  p (  ) we can compute  ( ) t v, ψ  as above by 
means of the inversion formula to get a  ( ) x f .  That   be a well 
defined (and “nice”) density function (i.e. 
f
( )≥ x f 0 and  ) 
is, therefore, the necessary and sufficient condition for 
rationalizability within the restrictions of Example 3.  What one 
gets, unfortunately, is not precisely a transparent condition. 
() ∫ =1 dx x f
 










1 2 cx bx ax x − − =
  For given   the equation 
 yields a non-linear indifference curve through the 
origin. Actually, I have no idea if this model is identified or not.  
c b a , ,  17
Since we only have two variables but three parameters the guess is 
that it is not but… 
 
 
In the next section I present the promised generalization of   
Example 2. 
 
V. A generalization of Example 2. 
 
Let’s go back to the original set-up of Section IV with 
R R R
m n → x  : U  
Suppose first that   takes the additive form:  U
( ) () () ( )q x g q x g q x g q x m m . ... , U 1 1 = + + =
3 q
.  This covers all the polynomial 
cases and, pushed to the limit, could cover all the analytic utility 
functions.  If   lies in the segment [ ]
n R q q ⊂
2 1,  then  ( )
3 ,   .   U q  is 
intermediate between  ( )
1 ,   .   U q  and  ( )
2
3 ≥ m
n R g → :
,   .   U q  (or, rather, their 
preference relations are) in the sense used by Chichilnisky and 
Grandmont.  In fact, one could wonder if for   the concept of 
intermediate preferences provides a characterization of the above 




Suppose that in the space of parameter 
m R  there are some a priori 






0 = −c q  
The density   is supported in the set of solutions to the above 




Proposition:  A sufficient condition for the model to be identified, 
i.e., for every nice  f  to be recoverable, is that: 
 
























Moreover, only the values of  p (  ) on a neighbourhood of 0 matter. 
 
Sketch of proof: Denote 
 
() ( )
{} α α     :
, 0






{} c Bq q N = = : .   
The three are subspaces of 
m R  (  is affine). It is a simple 
exercise to verify that if the rank condition is satisfied then the 
dimension of L is not smaller than the dimension of M and, in fact, 
that the projection of L on M is onto. 
N
 
We now argue that any affine half space in   i.e. any set of the 
form 
N
{} β < ∈ = y q N q A . :
L
,  , can be realized by taking a   
belonging to   and putting 
m R y∈ y
0 = β .  Indeed, we can first realize   
in the form of 
A
{} z . q z q. : N q A < ∈ = , where   A q ∈  and   belongs to the 
translate of   to the origin.  If the rank condition is satisfied 
then  .  So, 0  and therefore 
z
N
0 ≠ c N ∉ { } z q z N q . q. : = ∈  spans a 
hyperplane in M .  By the observation in the previous paragraph this 
hyperplane is realized for some  L y∈ .  This   does the job.  y  19
 
Appealing now (with some care) to the Implicit Function Theorem we 
conclude that any affine half space in   can be realized in the 
form 
N
( ) { 0 . : < ∈ x g q N q }  for an arbitrarily small  x . 
 




0 . : x g q N q
dx x f x p )  we 
can finally recover   from  f p  by using the Fourier analysis 
techniques discussed in Example 3. This ends the sketch of proof. 
 
Example 3 shows that the rank condition is sufficient but not 
necessary for identification.  The ability to use any  x  not limited 
to a neighbourhood of the origin, may make up for insufficient 
variation of  g  at 0.  Nevertheless, it can be presumed (?) that a 
more general condition will again revolve on a counting of effective 
parameters versus independent directions of variations of  .  () x g
 
Remark:  The entire analysis of this section uses only the 
information contained in  ( ) x p , i.e. only on the pairwise comparison 
that include the origin.  It stands to reason that if more 
information was available, eg. on all pairwise comparisons, then 
fewer identifying restrictions would suffice. 
 
   20
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